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Review
The Justice as Janus-Figure
Sheldon M. Novick. Honorable Justice: The Life of Oliver Wendell
Holmes. New York: Little, Brown & Company, 1989. Pp. 522. $21.95.
Allen D. Boyer
On June 1, 1862, in the Virginia Tidewater, the 20th Massachusetts
Regiment was ordered to prepare for an attack by Confederate cavalry.
Fixing their bayonets, the men formed up in a hollow square. Company
G, led by Captain Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., faced the direction from
which the enemy was expected. As Sheldon Novick relates the story, Cap-
tain Holmes
unsheathed his sword and held his pistol ready-a cavalry charge
would come right on them, and the men would have to stand. Wen-
dell swore loudly that he would shoot the first man who ran or fired
against orders.
But the Confederate cavalry did not come. Darkness fell, and the
men of Company G cheered their captain for his bravery.'
Three aspects of this deserve consideration: what Holmes said he would
do, how he said it, and how his men reacted. Properly read, the incident is
a parable of our own relationship with our most celebrated judge.
1. S. Novick, Honorable Justice: The Life of Oliver Wendell Holmes 59 (1989).
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HOLMES AND His MYTH
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes broods like a sphinx on the distant ho-
rizon of American law. Most law students know to connect him with free-
dom of speech, the phrase "a clear and present danger," and the idea of
shouting fire in a crowded theatre.' They conclude that Holmes was a
champion of free speech, which is wrong. Most lawyers, recalling
Holmes's dissent in Lochner v. New York," consider Holmes a foe of So-
cial Darwinism and liberty of contract. This is also wrong. Buck v. Bell,"
on the sterilization of the mentally disabled, is probably the only case in
which the general idea of what Holmes held coincides with what Holmes
actually held-and here the Justice's declaration, "Three generations of
imbeciles are enough," leaves little room for misunderstanding.
A generation back, we thought we knew how to think of Holmes.
Holmes was the archetype of the grand old judge, someone who both em-
bodied the virtues of the old social order and recognized the needs of the
emerging age. Now we think we know better. In the 1940's, connections
were drawn between Holmes's deference to authority and the might-
makes-right weltanschauung of Hitler's Germany. By the 1960's, Holmes
had come to be portrayed as a terrifying fossil, a man grossly indifferent
to individual rights and to the plight of the underprivileged.5
This may be why, sometime around 1980, a new element surfaced in
Holmes's black legend. Holmes was so much of a monster, one heard, that
no one could stand to write about him. That was why a series of biogra-
phers-Felix Frankfurter, Mark DeWolfe Howe, and Grant Gil-
more-had all proved unable to finish their task.6
At the start of Honorable Justice, Sheldon Novick seems to share this
viewpoint.
Justice Holmes proved to be a shadowed figure, marked by the big-
otry and sexism of his age, who in personal letters seemed to espouse
a kind of fascist ideology. He was a violent, combative, womanizing
aristocrat whose contribution to the development of law was surpris-
ingly difficult to define.7
2. See Schenk v. United States, 249 US. 47 (1919).
3. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
4. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
5. For a survey of currents in Holmesian scholarship, see White, The Rise and Fall of Justice
Holmes, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 51 (1971).
6. Frankfurter put aside the project after being named to the Supreme Court. In addition to
collecting and indexing Holmes's letters and papers-a huge achievement, to which Novick pays due
homage-Howe completed two volumes, covering Holmes's career through 1882. M. Howe, Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes: The Shaping Years (1957) and The Proving Years (1963). Though Gilmore produced
no book devoted solely to Holmes, the Justice figures in Gilmore's The Death of Contract (1974) and
The Ages of American Law (1977). See also J. Monagan, Grand Panjandrum: The Mellow Years of
Justice Holmes (1988) (collection of biographical essays); G. Aichele, Oliver Wendell Holmes: Sol-
dier, Scholar, Judge (1989).
7. S. Novick, supra note 1, at xvii. Novick feels that "both Howe and Gilmore came to regret
[Vol. 2: 417
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This passage, on its own, would be as one-sided a portrait of Holmes as
the one Catherine Bowen painted in Yankee from Olympus: "a man
whose presence carried tradition . . . courtly, witty, scholarly, kind." 8
The measure of Honorable Justice is that Novick does not rest with such
simplifications. He faces, ably, the challenge which wore down Holmes"s
earlier biographers: reconciling the absolutism of Holmes's opinions with
the complexity of the man who wrote them.
HOLMES IN His INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT
Most judges work within the closed system of the law. They apply,
creatively misread, or criticize the elements which they find there. (Jack-
son, Cardozo, and both Justices Harlan were of this school.) For those
who pursue an extra-legal agenda, nearly always the decisive factor is
politics. (Here one finds John Marshall, and, at different ends of the po-
litical spectrum, William Howard Taft and William 0. Douglas.)
Holmes stands on his own-certainly unequaled, arguably unparal-
leled-in suggesting that legal decisions be measured by standards taken
from cultural realms.
The opinions Holmes wrote contain few allusions and non-legal refer-
ences; the Lochner tag-line is a notable exception. Like other judges,
Holmes decided cases more readily on technical points and established
doctrines than on the basis of philosophical principle. But Holmes's work,
inevitably, must be read in the context of Holmes's life. Here it is that one
finds the connection: through Holmes's non-judicial writings, his conver-
sations and speeches, and his friendships and work relationships-the
most enduring of which led to the intellectual and academic worlds, rather
than to politics and finance.
"No one will ever have a truly philosophic mastery over the law who
does not habitually consider the forces outside of it which have made it
what it is," Holmes wrote.' Whether one speaks in terms of jurispruden-
tial affinity, or in terms of the personal cult which surrounds him (and
which remains unique among judges), Holmes is our intellectual'grandfa-
ther. He gave us the archetype of the judge as intellectual, much as Oscar
Wilde, his contemporary, helped create the persona of the artist as social
rebel and satiric clown. Each rian, in Wilde's phrase, put his genius into
his life.
For Louis Brandeis, it has been suggested, an evening's leisure reading
would have been the reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
having undertaken" Holmes's biography. Id.
8. C. Bowen, Yankee from Olympus: Justice Holmes and His Family xi (1943). Such comments
sound naive, but one should not be too hard on Bowen. Her book had all the flaws and all the
unexpected virtues of a good television docudrama. If it fictionalized many details, it also captured
Holmes's mythic dimension, which fact-bound essays on the Justice do not.
9. Holmes, Book Notices, 14 Am. L. Rev. 233 (1980).
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Holmes's reading, reconstructed from the book lists he kept, was much
more varied. He read and re-read Aristotle and Plato (possibly so that
others might see him reading Aristotle and Plato). He also read Hobbes,
Hegel, Marx, Spinoza, Herbert Spencer, Dante, The Virginian, Jean-
Henri Fabr's Souvenirs Entomologiques, and Moby Dick. Other schol-
arly ties included youthful talks with Emerson, early associations with
Henry and William James, a mountain-climbing tour of Switzerland with
critic Leslie Stephen (later the father of Virginia Woolf), and sustained
correspondences with Frederick Pollock, Harold Laski, and Kaneko
Kentaro.
One could say that Holmes inherited these scholastic traits. As Brook
Thomas has shown, the first decades of the nineteenth century saw an
interpenetration of literature and law."0 Irving, Lowell, Bryant, and
Longfellow all studied for the law, and legal reading was a hobby of
James Fenimore Cooper. James B. Thayer, Holmes's law partner and
teaching colleague, had originally been offered a professorship of English
at Harvard. As class poet of Harvard's class of 1861, and the son of Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes Senior-essayist, novelist, poet, and medical re-
former-Holmes was, perhaps, this era's last titan.
Holmes's links to nineteenth-century thought go beyond questions of
influence; among his contemporaries, he was a front-line thinker. Across
the disciplines, increasing mastery of the external world had become
shaded by a new appreciation of the complexity of the internal world. In
the years when Holmes was writing that the judge's certainty might be
illusion," Henry James was exploring the idea of the unreliable narrator,
the fictional speaker whose mistakes and lies are perceived by the reader.
Holmes defined law as "the prophecies of what the courts will do in
fact."' 2 This was close to the way in which Charles Peirce (a member,
with Holmes, of the Cambridge Metaphysical Club) defined the objectives
of Pragmatism-so close that a debate continues over the connection.
[I]n order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one
should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result
by necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these
consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception."
10. B. Thomas, Cross-Examinations of Law and Literature: Cooper, Hawthorne, Stowe and
Melville (1987). Robert Ferguson, another student of this era, observes, "The central texts of Ameri-
can republicanism acquire new coherence from a legal aesthetic just below the surface. Similar lines of
force inform early American poetry and fiction." R. Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture
7 (1984).
11. See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 167, 181 (1920) (re-
printed from 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897)).
12. Id. at 173.
13. 5 C. Peirce, Collected Papers, para. 9 (C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss & A. W. Burke ed. 1931-58).
See White, Looking at Holmes in the Mirror, 4 L. & Hist. Rev. 440 (1986); Note, Holmes, Peirce,
and Legal Pragmatism, 84 Yale L.J. 1123 (1975); Frank, A Conflict with Oblivion: Some Observa-
tions of the Founders of Legal Pragmatism, 9 Rutgers L. Rev. 425 (1954); Fisch,.Justice Holmes, the
[Vol. 2: 417
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The man who wrote The Common Law was not alone in analyzing how
abstractions manifested themselves in the real world. Frank Norris and
Theodore Dreiser, with their novels about corporations and commodities
speculation (The Octopus and The Pit, and The Financier), undertook a
very similar task." William James as well, in The Varieties of Religious
Experience, sought to measure the transcendental against what could be
ascertained from biology and psychology.
As a theorist, Holmes had a piece of rare good fortune: events kept pace
with his formulations. "If you want to know the law and nothing else," he
stated in 1897, in another of his famous declarations, "you must look at it
as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such
knowledge enables him to predict." 5 About the same time, Paul Cravath
reached the same insight. Surveying the ruinous effects of railroad strikes,
and anticipating what the Sherman Act might bring, Cravath decided that
the lawyer's job was no longer to plead for justice. In the future, the law-
yer's job would be to keep the client out of court. Holmes's bad man was
the doppelganger of Cravath's railroad-baron clients. Reinforcing this
connection, on a psychological level, is the fact that the Justice often ex-
pressed admiration for James J. Hill, president of the Great Northern
Railway.
The service which Holmes saw in the Civil War, the cultural water-
shed of his era, has been one of the brightest elements in his life story. He
began as a lieutenant and ended as a twenty-three-year-old lieutenant-
colonel; he saw action at Ball's Bluff, Antietam, and Chancellorsville, and
was seriously wounded in each battle. Not particularly nostalgic, he none-
theless drew on the war for inspiration. It gave him the metaphor of "the
soldier's faith," a stalwart dedication to duty.
[I]n the midst of doubt, in the collapse of creeds, there is one thing I
do not doubt . . .and that is that the faith is true and adorable
which leads a soldier to throw away his life in obedience to a blindly
accepted duty, in a cause which he little understands, in a plan of
campaign of which he has no notion, under tactics of which he does
not see the use.'e
This much was noble, but the metaphor had a darker implication. This
was that a judge, like a soldier, should steadily follow his sovereign's or-
ders; or, put differently, that judicial activism could only be justified by
Prediction Theory of Law, and Pragmatism, 39 J. Philosophy 85 (1942).
14. See W.B. Michaels, The Gold Standard and the Logic of Naturalism: American Literature at
the Turn of the Century (1987); R. Martin, American Literature and the Universe of Force (1981);
Hopkins, The Development of Realism in Law and Literature During the Period 1883-1933: The
Cultural Resemblance, 4 Pace L. Rev. 29 (1983).
15. Holmes, supra note 11, at 171.
16. Quoted in S. Novick, supra note 1, at 205.
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fundamental crises. In Giles v. Harris,17 one of his earliest Supreme
Court opinions, Holmes held, in effect, that federal courts should not en-
force the voting rights of black Southerners, unless the federal government
were prepared to fight a new civil war to do so. 8 Yet Giles is not
Holmes's final word on racial bias and Southern states' rights. It must be
balanced-can one really say reconciled?-with Nixon v. Herndon, in
which Holmes wrote for the Court in upholding black citizens' right to
vote in the Texas Democratic primary."
This judicial equivocation, too, is illumined by Holmes's Civil War ser-
vice. In 1864, after three years of wounds and dysentery, he obtained a
release from front-line duty. A letter home explained:
I am convinced from my late experience that if I can stand the wear
& tear (body & mind) of regimental duty that it is a greater strain
on both than I am called on to endure-If I am satisfied I don't
really see that anyone else has a call to be otherwise. . . . I am not
the same man (may not have the same ideas) & certainly am not so
elastic as I was and I will not acknowledge the same claims upon me
under those circumstances that existed formerly .... o
Saul Touster showed in 1965, in an unsurpassed study of Holmes's war-
time writing, that our image of Holmes is an image which the Justice
consciously shaped, by retelling certain tales and burning certain letters.2"
The soldier's faith was not as forthright as it seemed. It consisted less in
what the infantry officer had actually felt than in what the scholarly judge
felt compelled to hallow.
Holmes's jurisprudence is one of those subjects on which one should say
either very much or very little. On The Common Law, Novick takes the
latter course. "No short summary could do justice to this long, difficult,
and original work," he apologizes.2" But his summary, pared down to six
short paragraphs, can be compelling in its eloquent suggestion.
For twelve evenings, Holmes spoke steadily, a frail figure describing
an extraordinary vision. The common law seemed to be spread out
before him like an immense, forbidding landscape, its contours
heaved and buckled by unconscious forces-the passions for ven-
17. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
18. Alabama's white residents might clearly intend to disenfranchise their black neighbors,
Holmes wrote, but
[t]o meet such an intent something more than ordering the plaintiffs' names to be inscribed
upon the lists of 1902 will be needed. . . . [Rielief from a great political wrong, if done as
alleged, by the people of a State and the State itself, must be given by them or by the legisla-
tive and political departments of the government of the United States.
Id. at 488.
19. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
20. Quoted in S. Novick, supra note 1, at 85 (emphasis in original).
21. Touster, In Search of Holnesfrom Within, 18 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 437 (1965).
22. S. Novick, supra note 1, at 437.
[Vol. 2: 417
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geance and blame, the fierce instinct with which an animal defends
what it has, the strange fantasy that an heir absorbs and becomes his
father. Law began as a substitute for private violence and unre-
strained passion. Its rules and explanations were only rationaliza-
tions for what judges felt obliged to decide. Unconscious motives lay
behind their opinions. As civilization advanced and society became
more complex, precedents were mechanically repeated, but new ex-
planations were continuously invented, and eventually the outmoded
form was reshaped by its new purpose."8
Mark DeWolfe Howe, in examining Holmes, chose "to place a book,
rather than a living person, at the center of the stage."" Novick takes the
other approach. Honorable Justice is a study of Holmes the object, noi a
critique of Holmes the subject. Novick consistently drops into the endnotes
other discussions of Holmes's legal work: the Justice's constitutional the-
ory, the structure of his article Privilege, Malice, and Intent, turn-of-the-
century substantive due process doctrine, Holmes's sudden shift on free-
dom of speech, the dispute over Buck v. Bell, and even Holmes's "most
famous contribution" to American common law, "that everyone is held to
the conduct expected of an ordinary reasonable person, stated in objective
terms."2
5
In discussing Holmes's years on the Supreme Court, Novick empha-
sizes famous cases: Giles v. Harris, Northern Securities Co. v. United
States, 2  Lincoln v. United States,'7 Lochner, Muller v. Oregon, 2  Ham-
mer v. Dagenhart,'9 Schenk, Debs v. United States,83 Abrams v. United
States, 1 Gitlow v. New York,82 United States v. Schwimmer,3' Buck v.
Bell, and Olmstead v. United States." This restriction is understandable,
given the limits of the one-volume format, but this list is too exclusive.
Not mentioned, and they should be, are Bailey v. Alabama," Frank v.
23. Id. at 158-59.
24. 2 M. Howe, supra note 6, at 253.
25. See id. at 444, 446-47, 456-57, 473-74, 477-78, 434. Cross-checking is irksome, but we may
have been spoiled by law-review articles, which have the luxury of spending fifty pages on a single
case.
26. 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1903) (Holmes's first dissent; application of Sherman Act to merger of
railroad companies).
27. 197 U.S. 419 (1905) .(Philippine tariffs struck down, in a slap in the face of William Howard
Taft; Holmes writing for a unanimous Court).
28. 208 U.S. 408 (1908) (labor legislation on maximum hours upheld, following argument by
Louis Brandeis).
29. 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (anti-child labor statute invalidated, over a dissent by Holmes).
30. 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (conviction of anti-draft speaker affirmed; Holmes writing for a unani-
mous Court).
31. 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (conviction of anti-war protestors affirmed, over a dissent by Holmes).
32. 262 U.S. 652 (1925) (conviction under New York criminal anarchy statute upheld, over a
dissent by Holmes).
33. 279 U.S. 644 (1928) (denial of naturalization to pacifist affirmed, over a dissent by Holmes).
34. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (use of illegally-obtained wiretap evidence allowed by Court, over a
dissent by Holmes).
35. 219 U.S. 219 (1911) (Alabama statute enforcing debt peonage invalidated, over a dissent by
1990]
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Mangum,3  Moore v. Dempsey,"' Meyer v. Nebraska,88  Nixon v.
Herndon, and United States v. Ju Toy. 39
Novick makes it clear that Holmes sought to judge solely on legal is-
sues; the Justice never read newspapers, and wanted to decide Northern
Securities, a case involving railroad empires, as if it involved "two small
exporting grocers." Novick is not as clear when it comes to presenting
Holmes's theory of judicial deference.4 0 For this one must turn to the vo-
luminous body of law-review articles on Holmes's decisions, just as one
should still look to Mark DeWolfe Howe for a discussion of Holmes's
intellectual influences.
The book is stronger when it examines Holmes's work as a judge of
ordinary cases. Of his time on the Massachusetts Supreme Judiciary
Court, Novick observes:
The great Constitutional questions that Holmes would decide were
still far in the future. The stuff of the court's work was adultery,
greed, the private warfare of commerce, fights between neighbors
and within families, wills, rapes, murders: the trivial, violent con-
stants of human life, of the thousand-year-old common law.41
After two decades on this bench, when he moved to Washington, "Holmes
found that he was again a member of what was fundamentally a common-
law court.' '4' He wrote opinions quickly, in two or three days' time. This
was one reason he eventually turned out 873 majority opinions (a record
which still stands, and which far outstrips his 30 concurrences and 72
dissents).' 8
To focus on great cases makes bad legal history. In Holmes's case, how-
ever, this may now be unavoidable. Most of his federal decisions belong to
the era of Swift v. Tyson and the vanished jurisprudence of the federal
Holmes).
36. 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (conviction at a trial dominated by lynch mob upheld, over a dissent by
Holmes).
37. 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob-dominated trial held a violation of due process; opinion written by
Holmes).
38. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (ban on non-English language instruction invalidated, over a dissent by
Holmes).
39. 198 U.S. 253 (1905) (denial of immigration to Chinese descendant approved; opinion written
by Holmes).
40. Were Holmes on the Court today, he would be voting consistently with Antonin Scalia. The
quintessential Scalia opinion, holding that a court cannot strike down laws simply because it disagrees
with them, is the quintessential Holmes opinion. Compare Scalia's concurrence in CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 96-97 (1987) ("a law can be both economic folly and
constitutional") with Holmes's majority opinion in Debs.
41. S. Novick, supra note 1, at 171.
42. Id. at 256.
43. Chief Justice Fuller was delighted with his Court's newest member: "We shall dispose of
more than fifty cases at our next meeting-more than ever before I believe. . . .The Nimble Holmes
has got out his last-I delayed his progress for about a week but he . . .I suppose [is] eager for more
work." Id., citing W. King, Melville Weston Fuller 291 (1950).
[Vol. 2: 417
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common law."" Whatever their merits, they were mooted by Erie Rail-
road v. Tompkins.4' The reminder is useful, however, that Holmes could
write hundreds of opinions for a generally conservative Court, working as
smoothly with Taft as he did with Brandeis.
It is also a merit of this biography that Holmes's Japanese correspon-
dents, early students at Harvard who discussed with him the traditions of
their homeland, receive the same attention given to Holmes's English
proteg6s.
The Japanese civil war was contemporary with the American, but
how strange it must have been for Holmes to hear stories of these
men who had fought in armor. When Kaneko left home, samurai
men had still worn swords as part of their ordinary dress. Bushido,
their code of chivalry and their romanticism about the feudal age just
passing, struck a chord in Holmes. The Japanese had a "gentle-
manly air of incurious languor," and were privately a little scornful
of the blunt practicality of most American life."
Holmes seems to have drawn a clarifying connection between their samu-
rai code and his own vision of personal duty. Novick finds that the path of
the law "is probably a conscious reference to the Tao" and to "Bushido,
the Way of the Warrior, a term Holmes almost certainly knew."147 In a
book which Kaneko Kentaro gave to Holmes, the Japanese ethic is de-
scribed in terms which Holmes might have used to describe the common
law:
[Bushido] is not a written code-at best it consists of a few maxims
handed down from mouth to mouth or coming from the pen of some
well-known warrior or savant. . . .It was an organic growth of de-
cades and centuries of military career. It, perhaps, fills the same po-
sition in the history of ethics that the English Constitution does in
political history. . ..
Fair play in fight! What fertile germs of morality lie in this primi-
44. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
45. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). "Primarily interested in the common law," Holmes's bitterest critic
carped, "as a judge Holmes greatly influenced only constitutional law." Rogat, The Judge as Specta-
tor, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 213, 256 (1964). But while this criticism is unfair, thanks to an accident of
history-if Erie should be called such-one can still be thankful that Holmes failed to influence
greatly American common law. Despite sound decisions like Eaton v. Brown, 193 U.S. 411 (1904), a
probate case in which Holmes cut through supposition to the real intention of the testator, he was too
often mesmerized by abstractions. In Old Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn,
210 U.S. 206 (1908), Holmes let the fiction of corporate identity stand in the way of remedying a
fraud caused by stock-watering, and with Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931), his over-zealous concern
for unsecured "gap" creditors had the effect of unsettling every secured loan in which a delay ensued
between creation and perfection of the security interest.
46. S. Novick, supra note 1, at 147-48.
47. S. Novick, supra note 1, at 451.
1990]
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Like prior biographers, Novick mentions Holmes's personal
flaws-vanity and ambition, namely-and then quietly sweeps them
under the carpet. The problem here is a lack of hard proof. William
James, who was close to Holmes in the late 1860's, described him as
"formed like a planing machine to gouge a deep, self-beneficial groove
through life." ''9 He could be "disingenuous," Novick concludes, and "dis-
semble[d] his eagerness" over his appointments to the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judiciary Court and the Supreme Court. And there are other hints:
that Holmes had his after-dinner speeches printed, that he liked telling
people about his Civil War record (sometimes embroidering the facts),
that in protocol-conscious Washington he refused to be seated below Cabi-
net members. He also "shamelessly primed" Morris R. Cohen, who was
reviewing his Collected Legal Papers for The New Republic, by "passing
on to him praise that others had given at the time the essays were first
published.""
No one rises to the Supreme Court by accident. Throughout Holmes's
career, things fell smoothly into place for him. Writing anonymously for
the American Law Review, he dismissed Christopher Columbus Langdell
as "perhaps the greatest living legal theologian"-then accepted a chair at
the law school where Langdell was dean.51 At the end of his first semes-
ter, he was offered an appointment to the bench; he accepted in less than
three hours, without consulting his colleagues at Harvard. Little can be
proven from these facts; much can be inferred. The true measure of
Holmes's ambition may be that he covered his tracks so well."3
One clue may lie in Holmes's political involvements. We recall that
Holmes served in the Union Army. We tend to forget, although the con-
nection is logical, that he was a lifelong member of the Republican
Party.5 When Theodore Roosevelt named him to the Supreme Court, it
48. 1. Nitobe, Bushido: The Soul of Japan 4-8 (1905), quoted in S. Novick, supra note 1, at 274.
49. Quoted in S. Novick, supra note 1, at 152.
50. Id. at 475.
51. 0. W. Holmes, Book Notices, supra note 9, at 234. The relationship between Langdell and
Holmes, too often seen as a manichean opposition of formalist and realist, is demolished in Touster,
Holmes A Hundred Years Ago: The Common Law and Legal Theory, 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 673, 690-
704 (1982) (reprinting Holmes's review of Langdell's casebook), and G. Gilmore, The Ages of Amer-
ican Law, supra note 6, at 41-67. But see Frank, Mr. Justice Holmes and Non-Euclidean Legal
Thinking, 17 Cornell L.Q. 569 (1931).
52. For details of the academic maneuvering behind Holmes's leap to the bench, see 2 M. Howe,
supra note 6, at 265-270. Holmes had allowed himself the option to resign from the faculty if a
judicial appointment were offered.
53. Holmes's circle included Henry Cabot Lodge as well as Louis Brandeis. His first judicial
appointment came in the last weeks of a Republican state administration, which was one of the rea-
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was because Holmes's "soldier's faith" address had reassured the Presi-
dent that Holmes would give sound decisions on critical issues. Seen in
this light, does this mean that Holmes's most famous speech was what
Robert Bork's Indiana U4niversity lecture would be, a signal flag hoisted
to those who name federal judges?
Holmes's fondness for women, by contrast, is a foible which Novick
explores at length. This was already well-known; one familiar story has
the ninety-year-old Holmes, seated on a park bench beside Brandeis,
watching a pretty young woman walk past and exclaiming, "Oh, to be
eighty again!" Womanizing does not quite describe him-Holmes never
stalked; he flirted-but the Justice was quite persistently gallant. His ca-
reer could be described in terms of women: Lowell factory girls and Bbs-
ton ladies of letters, Washington matrons, and, finally, young women
reporters.
The most serious liaison involved Lady Clare Castletown, an Irish no-
blewoman. How far this relationship went is uncertain. It was serious
enough that he told her to write him in care of the courthouse, and wrote
back faithfully-daily, at first. They corresponded for twenty years. And
yet, even here, Holmes insulated himself. With the gray Atlantic between
himself and Lady Castletown, for all but a few weeks of the affair, this
was a romance, and nothing more.
One senses sublimation here, the presence of a strong libido which
found full expression only in work. Holmes flirted in the same way that
he read Casanova and went to burlesque shows. His affairs seem to have
been half-hearted, adolescent strayings by a man who distrusted passion.
When he joined the Harvard faculty, his mannerisms gravened. When he
moved to the bench, judicial propriety settled like a pall over his home
life:
[H]is own grandfather had resigned from the court, unable to carry
the burden, and Holmes was not sure of his own health. . . . Ac-
cordingly, there was to be no more dining out, no more late parties,
drinking, or talking. Even aside from the constant worry over his
health, the work was new and required alert attention. . . . At his
doctor's suggestion, Fanny began reading novels and poems aloud to
Holmes in the evenings, to spare his eyes; Holmes would sometimes
play solitaire while Fanny read. 4
Prior books have portrayed Fanny Dixwell Holmes, Holmes's wife of
fifty-seven years, as a plain, retiring, devoted helpmate. Novick shows that
she was something more. She avoided photographs and interviews-which
sons his decision was so speedily made. And so faithful a party man was he that he thought of
resigning from the Supreme Court in 1928, when it looked as though Al Smith might be elected
President; he did not want a Democrat to name his successor.
54. S. Novick, supra note 1, at 170.
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gave rise, probably, to her reputation for shyness. Most of her own desire
for self-expression went into embroidery. But she argued with her hus-
band over his Abrams dissent (she wanted him to join the majority) and
she ranked with him as a coiner of aphorisms. Washington, she said, was
"full of famous men and the women they had married when they were
young. 
'55
Novick also traces well the troubling likeness between Holmes and his
father. What his household members said, Oliver Wendell Holmes Senior
wrote up for publication; that was the source for The Autocrat of the
Breakfast-Table and his other books of essays."6 During the Civil War,
when he learned that his son had been wounded, Doctor Holmes traveled
across Maryland and Pennsylvania to find him-but even then, his jour-
nalist's sense of a story never left him. His search became "My Hunt
After 'The Captain,' " a celebrated article for The Atlantic. The elder
Holmes would give up his family's privacy for a magazine story, making
their private life part of the public domain. It is hardly surprising that his
son would subordinate private life to public duty.57
Honorable Justice, despite some rough spots in the final text, is a solid
and well-written biography.58 Novick quotes Holmes often enough to
make one wish he had quoted Holmes more. If the book has a flaw, it is a
reluctance to spell out what its facts imply, but the facts are given, and the
facts are marshalled well.
Between Holmes's life and Holmes's work as a judge, there is a connec-
tion which must be drawn. The man who grew apart from his friends was
also the scholar who spoke of detaching morality from law. Holmes's def-
erence to legislatures is what one would expect from a man who shunned
personal and moral involvements."' His theory of judicial restraint refines
and sublimates his personal aloofness; a judge who does not strike down
laws need not face the responsibility of such action.
55. Id. at 260.
56. Doctor Holmes was the Autocrat. His son appeared as three successive characters: a divinity
student, a Young Astronomer, and a Counsellor and Politician. Fanny Dixwell, interestingly, ap-
peared under the name of Scheherezade.
57. The middle-aged doctor gave the young soldier a vial of laudanum, and urged him to take it if
he were shot through the lungs, in order to spare himself a lingering death. This Roman paternalism
prefigures the son's view of the human condition. A man instructed by his father in the way of
committing suicide, and who accepts such instruction, will not be prone to spontaneous gestures of
liberality.
58. It was on Holmes's ninety-second birthday, not his ninety-first (p. 376) that Franklin Delano
Roosevelt paid him a visit. Calling the C.S.S. Alabama "an armored ship" (p. 145) conflates the
commerce raider with either the Laird Rams or the C.S.S. Stonewall, none of which ever saw combat.
To describe Utilitarianism as "puritanical" (p. 99) is very imprecise. It is worse to ascribe to Holmes
"a kind of fascist ideology" (p. xvii) without clarifying that this adjective is used as a political term-of-
art. On the other hand, Novick emends several previous errors. He shows, for example, that earlier
reports of a friendship between Holmes and Sir Henry Maine arose from misdatings; the two men
met only once, in 1874 (p. 432).
59. Holmes came to disfavor private charities, and left his money to the federal government. A
religious skeptic, he and his wife attended Unitarian services: "In Boston one had to be something,
and Unitarian was the least one could be." S. Novick, supra note 1, at 368.
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It is tempting to make out a disparity between the free-thinking juris-
prudent and the authoritarian judge. Holmes failed to fuse thought and
action, one could say; he never championed rights or liberties except when
he could safely do so from dissent. But this viewpoint is rooted in anach-
ronism. Because Holmes died in 1935, we forget that he was born in
1841. His era's history chronicled the victories of nations and races. Its
politics saw imperialism as an acceptable option. Its science had discov-
ered that the fittest prospered while the unfit perished.
Although the nineteenth century felt qualms, it took action. As a man
of his era, Holmes was more likely to effectuate solutions than to accept
doubt. Sometimes he is called a skeptic; in fact, he was a stoic. If princi-
ples proved illusory, facts could certainly be grasped. If ideas of truth
might change tomorrow, answers could still be given today.
The truth is that Holmes's familiarity with intellectual and social
realms outside the law may have contributed to his authoritarianism. If
legal rules are not the only source which judges rely upon-if judges must
draw upon a broad, interdisciplinary spectrum of cultural experience,
rather than upon principles and logic-then it is really the decision of the
judge which matters. To widen the range of criteria upon which a deci-
sion can be based means enlarging the powers of the decision-maker. In
the life of the law, whose experience counted? The judge's.
This privileging of the judicial role, this focus on what the courts would
do in fact, explains much of Holmes's own career. It accords with his own
ambition. It also explains his fondness for cranking out opinions on com-
mon-law matters while ignoring the economic and political dimensions of
Northern Securities, Schenk, and Debs. To refine an evolving legal doc-
trine, in the Justice's view, must have furthered the cause of humanity as
much as defending any one individual's rights.6"
In Novick's abridgement of The Common Law, a final insight is buried.
Law began as a substitute for private violence and unrestrained passion.
Its rules and explanations were only rationalizations for what judges felt
obliged to decide. Holmes's masterwork has long been read as both histor-
ical study and theoretical polemic. If its vision of law parallels what the
law had meant in Holmes's own life, can The Common Law be read a
third way, as a psychological self-portrait? The strange fantasy that an
heir absorbs and becomes his father.. Did Holmes focus on succession be-
cause of his ambivalent relationship with his own father? New explana-
tions were continually invented, and eventually the outmoded form was
60. The interests which Holmes showed in his scholarly works foreshadow the severity he would
show on the bench. He opened The Common Law by discussing how the law had originally imposed
punishments upon inanimate objects. The theme which wound through successive lectures was how
law had come to impose liability irrespective of a defendant's subjective motive. Such discussions im-
plicitly equate defendants with non-human deodands and deny the individual self-worth of parties-at
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reshaped by its new purpose. This speaks, implicitly, to what Holmes has
become, a subject reinterpreted by succeeding legal generations.
HOLMES IN OUR TIME
Honorable Justice, the first full biography of a long-dead judge, was
not brought out by a university press. It was produced by a commercial
publishing house. (Little, Brown & Co., probably not coincidentally, was
also the publisher of The Common Law.) Nor is its author a professional
legal historian; Novick's background lies in environmental law.
These facts reveal our continuing fascination with Holmes. Most of his
holdings no longer bind us. We shift losses now to distribute costs, not if
and only if the defendant was at fault. Holmes wrote as if each person
were a unit of the state; our writings suggest that government exists to
interfere with people's lives. Yet Holmes remains one of our principal
touchstones. We try out our newest hypotheses by asking what Grandfa-
ther would have done.6" And while Holmes's fortunes have waned over
the last two decades, one suspects that they will be revived as rights-based
constitutional analysis is challenged by majoritarian theory.62
Holmes retains his relevance for the same reason that his writing
strikes us as literary. By stamping judicial decisions with his own perspec-
tive, he opened up the distance between text, author, and reader, estab-
lishing a triune relationship which we feel compelled to keep
reassessing.
63
It is poetic, in the technical sense, to express oneself through metaphor
and personification. It is poetic to match a latinate phrase with an Anglo-
Saxon guttural, or to whipsaw an abstraction with a homespun exam-
ple.64 It is poetic to suggest, through the measured cadence of stately lan-
guage, that the thoughts being expressed are logical and majestic, and
therefore entitled to be obeyed.65 But such refinements are tangential, in
the context of a judicial opinion-which is, after all, merely the memoran-
61. See, e.g., Tushnet, The Logic of Experience: Oliver Wendell Holmes on the Supreme Judicial
Court, 63 Va. L. Rev. 975 (1977); Kelley, A Critical Analysis of Holmes's Theory of Torts, 61 Wash.
U. L. Rev. 681 (1983); Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30 (1985).
62. For an overture of the debate to come, see Fallon, What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth
Reviving?, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1695 (1989).
63. If literature includes writings which are meant to shape or examine the society in which they
are written, judicial opinions count as literature. Edmund Wilson ended his survey of Civil War
writing with a long discussion of Holmes. See E. Wilson, Patriotic Gore: Studies in the Literature of
the American Civil War 743-876 (1962).
64. Consider this passage: "When I think of the Law as we know her in the courthouse and the
market, she seems to me a woman sitting by the wayside, beneath whose overshadowing hood every
man shall see the countenance of his deserts or needs." 0. W. Holmes, Our Lady the Common Law,
in The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes 29-30 (M. Lerner ed. 1943).
65. If one doubts the importance of the law's stately language to its acceptance as legitimate,
consider that the Critical Legal Studies movement has tried to unsettle the law by adopting a new
diction, speaking of trashing and intersubjective zap. See Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36
Stan. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1984).
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dum and order being issued by the court. Where a judge polishes his writ-
ing so self-consciously, he is treating his work as a personal performance.
The more sophisticated a communication, the more varied the ways in
which it communicates. Holmes's dissenting opinions are as consciously
layered, in this sense, as good fiction or poetry. Rather than answering the
Abrams majority with lines of precedent, Holmes posed his appeal on a
different level.
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foun-
dations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our
Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.6
It is rare for a judge to reflect on the issue of judging. Holmes carefully
cast his dissent as a meditation on that theme, rather than presenting it as
the judicial decision that it was. To take no action is in fact to take action.
To wish to defer to the marketplace of ideas, in a censorship case, is to say
that the Court should let the defendants go free. The Abrams majority
might have unquestioned legal supremacy; Holmes carried the emotional
and philosophical high ground.
CONCLUSION
The law is majestic when a court expands it to reach a just outcome.
There is also an awesome severity about a court when, so to speak, it lets
the law takes its course. In solitary defense of noble causes, as a judge
defending justice against law, no jurist was ever more eloquent than
Holmes. But when he chose not to favor justice-when he chose not to
intervene, to let the law take its course-no jurist has ever been more
blunt.
Holmes's fellow justices, it has been said, "were well aware of his scorn
for any deviation from the result he thought the law required because that
result might be 'unjust' to the individuals concerned. '6 7 In cases like Buck
v. Bell and Baltimore & Ohio RR. Co. v. Goodman,68 one finds no doubt,
66. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (dissent of Justice Holmes).
67. 1 M. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes 289 (1951).
68. 275 U.S. 66 (1927). This case contained the following prescription for safe driving, circa
1927:
When a man goes upon a railroad track he knows ... that he must stop for the train, not the
train stop for him. In such circumstances it seems to us that if a driver cannot be sure other-
wise whether a train is dangerously near he must stop and get out of his vehicle, although
obviously he will not often be required to do more than to stop and look.
Id. at 69-70. It also contains the heartless line, "[N]othing is suggested by the evidence to relieve
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denial, or rationalization. Holmes faced squarely the results of his deci-
sions: to sterilize a retarded woman, to deny compensation to a widow. As
a poet of tough-mindedness, he ranks with Hemingway and Nietzsche.69
When Holmes spoke of the soldier's faith, significantly, he took the per-
spective of the soldier following orders, not that of the general making
decisions, seeking to influence the path of humanity. A man under orders
has given up both autonomy and responsibility. The traditional view is
that Holmes was a stern judge because he remembered his time as a
Union officer.7 ° It seems likely, however, that the truth was the reverse:
that Holmes's daily work as a judge kept him from forgetting Ball's Bluff,
Antietam, and Chancellorsville.
Judges, like soldiers, make costly decisions. They take actions which
irrevocably affect lives and fortunes. These tragic decisions-tragic in the
sense that some equity must be sacrificed so that some other equity may
be attained-are part of the daily life of the law. They are made when-
ever a court decides that precedent controls and that no exception will be
made, or that a statute of limitations has run, or that credible evidence
will not be presented to the jury. Whenever we make such decisions, put-
ting aside our personal assessments of what full justice would require, we
compromise ourselves with the law.
In The Common Law, there was the sense of a force which transcended
the petty and temporal. Life might be a struggle, and law-making a slow,
unprincipled enterprise, but evolution would lead to higher forms of life.
Holmes's dissents envision such possibilities. In his "unjust" opinions,
Holmes shows himself as a judge who did not flinch when responsibility
came down to action. And once we have made such decisions ourselves, we
feel a bond with Holmes. Let others criticize, this feeling runs; we are the
ones who have to act.
We may often disagree with Holmes. It is also clear that we share with
him this understanding. Behind his opinions, commands of the republic,
we sense a common appreciation of what the law must do-and, more
hopefully, an inextinguishable glimmer of what the law may someday
achieve. He leads us by example. Even if their orders ring out harshly or
Goodman from responsibility for his own death." Id at 69.
69. Because Holmes wrote bluntly about cases with tragic consequences, we may assume too
much too quickly. Holmes always wrote swiftly, and the cases would have had the same real-world
effect even if written in blander language. (How many people have criticized Brandeis for concurring
in Bell?) We should not presume that the style was necessarily the man. Benjamin Cardozo is re-
markable for his Anglophiliac verbosity, but no one claims to find a connection between his rhetoric
and his analyses-unless it is John Noonan, who in Persons and Masks of the Law (1976) belabors
both Holmes and Cardozo for pursuing abstractions at the expense of humanity. See also The Speech
of judges: A Dissenting Opinion, 29 Va. L. Rev. 625 (1943) (Jerome Frank anonymously attacking
Cardozo's style); cf. Freedman, The Dissenting Opinions of Justice Musinanno, 30 Temp. L.Q. 253
(1957).
70. Saul Touster has commented, "When he was talking about law he was talking about war; and
when he talked of war he lived it through the images of law." Touster, supra note 51, at 689.
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threaten too broadly, determined officers help make a well-ordered regi-
ment. And a well-ordered regiment, formed up in a proper square, will
withstand any number of cavalry charges.
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